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Introduction
The idea that …nance plays a key role in the process of economic development was central in the work of Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1911) . More recently, Levine (2005) described the four main mechanisms through which …nance can promote economic development: pooling savings; facilitating exchange; improving capital allocation through the production of ex ante information about investment opportunities; and increasing investors'willingness to …nance new projects through ex post monitoring.
However, Bagehot himself suggested that there can be decreasing returns to …nance: "If such a man [a banker] is very busy, it is a sign of something wrong. Either he is working at detail, which subordinates would do better . . . or he is engaged in too many speculations" (Bagehot, 1873, p. 214) . The possible social costs of very large …nancial sectors have also been emphasized by Minsky (1974) , Kindleberger (1978) , and Tobin (1984) . Minsky (1974) and Kindleberger (1978) suggested that the process of …nan-cial deepening may increase macroeconomic volatility. They wrote extensively about …nancial instability and …nancial manias. More recently, Rajan (2005) suggested that …nancial markets can become victims of their own success. In an article that was controversial in 2005 (see the discussions by Kohn, 2005 and Summers, 2005) but looks almost prophetic after the global …nancial crisis, Rajan argued that the longer …nancial systems prove to be reliable, the more demands will be placed on their services. In this situation, the process of …n-ancial deepening may lead to a large and complicated …nancial system and to an accumulation of vulnerabilities that may then result into a "catastrophic meltdown" Tobin (1984) , instead, focused on the possibility that a large …nancial system may lead to a misallocation of human resources. Speci…cally, he worried about the fact that the …nancial sector could "steal"talents from the productive sectors of the economy. Like Minsky (1974) and Kindleberger (1978) , he was also worried that possible bene…ts (in terms of liquidity and price discovery) of a large …nancial sector could be more than compensated by the creation of useless or even harmful …nancial instruments. His solution to this problem was a transaction tax (which came to be known as "Tobin Tax") aimed at limiting the incentives to use …nancial instruments for pure speculative purposes.
This paper starts with a ‡ash review of the empirical literature on the positive link between …nance and growth, it then describes the empirical literature that has shown that the marginal contribution of …nancial depth to economic growth becomes negative when credit to the private sector surpasses 100 percent of GDP (the "too much …nance"result), and assesses the robust-ness of this …nding. The paper concludes by describing the possible channels through which a large …nancial sector can slow down economic growth and by highlighting possible avenues for future research.
Finance is good for growth
This section provides a ‡ash review of the empirical literature showing that …nance has a positive e¤ect on economic growth. 1 Goldsmith (1969) was the …rst to empirically show the existence of a correlation between the size of the …nancial sector and long-run economic growth. He assembled data on the size (measured by total assets over GDP) of …nan-cial intermediaries for 35 countries over 1860-1963 and graphically showed that the size of the …nancial sector was positively correlated with economic growth. Goldsmith was aware that he could only prove correlation and made no claim that his measure of …nancial depth had a causal e¤ect on economic growth.
After a nearly 25-year hiatus, empirical research on the link between …n-ance and growth restarted in earnest in the early 1990s when King and Levine (1993) showed that the size of the …nancial sector in 1960 predicted economic growth, investment, and productivity growth over 1960-89, even after controlling for initial income, school enrollment, government consumption and trade openness. Along similar lines, Levine and Zervos (1998) showed that stock market liquidity (but not the size of the stock market) predicts GDP growth.
In two follow-up papers (Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000, and Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000), Levine and co-authors used di¤erent econometric techniques to show that …nancial depth causes growth. Speci…cally, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) used cross-sectional data and legal origin as an instrument for …nancial depth to show that the exogenous component of …nancial development has a statistically signi…cant e¤ect on long-run growth. Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), instead, used panel data and a set of internal instruments based on lagged variables to show that there is a causal link going from …nancial depth to economic growth.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide further evidence of a causal link going from …nancial depth to economic growth by looking at the relative performance of di¤erent industrial sectors across countries. By checking whether …n-ancial development relaxes …nancing constraints, Rajan and Zingales test a speci…c mechanism through which …nance may a¤ect growth. They start by observing that industries that, for purely technological reasons, need more …n-ancial resources should do relatively better in countries with more developed …nancial sectors. Next, they use a di¤erence in di¤erence speci…cation to show that the interaction between an industry-level index of …nancial needs and …n-ancial depth is positively correlated with industry-level value added growth. The Rajan and Zingales approach rules out reverse causality because there is no reason why the deviation between the average growth rate of the manufacturing sector and a given industry's growth rate should a¤ect …nancial development in the country as a whole.
Too Much Finance?
In mid-2011, Jean Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes and I …rst circulated a paper titled "Too Much Finance?" (Arcand et al., 2015a) . The paper shows that the correlation between …nancial depth and economic growth becomes negative when credit to the private sector is close to 100 percent of GDP (the speci…c threshold depends on the estimation method and the speci…c sample).
2 While we were not the …rst to study the presence of non-linearities in the relationship between …nancial depth and growth, we were probably among the …rst (together with Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012) to do so in a systematic way. The paper has accumulated a good number of citations (more than 600 on Google Scholar at the time of writing) and the "too much …nance"expression is now often used by journalists and policymakers. 3 A search on Google for "too much …nance"shows that the number of hits jumps from 8 in 2010 to 52 in the year we …rst circulated our paper and surpasses 200 in 2016. In fact, the number of Google hits tracks the paper's citations in Google Scholar ( Figure  1 ). 2 The paper was …rst discussed in a VoxEU article in April 2011 http://voxeu.org/article/has-…nance-gone-too-far, was then issued as an IMF working paper in June 2012 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12161.pdf and eventually published in the Journal of Economic Growth in May 2015. In turn, the too much …nance idea was based on a background note (Panizza, 2009 ) prepared for UNCTAD (2009). 3 See, for Instance, "Warning: too much …nance is bad for the economy" by The Economist (http://www.economist.com/blogs/buttonwood/2015/02/…nance-sectorand-growth) (an article that, incidentally does not even cite the "Too much …n-ance" paper), or Martin Wolf's Financial Times article titled "Why …nance is too much of a good thing" (https://www.ft.com/content/64c2f03a-03a0-11e5-a70f-00144feabdc0). Or a "Too much …nance?" question raised in the European Parliament (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2015-007727+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=mt)
Figure1: Number of hits in Google for "too much …nance" and citations of Arcand et al. in Google Scholar
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) were probably the …rst to empirically show that high income countries may have reached a point in which …nancial development no longer contributes to increasing the e¢ ciency of investment. Speci…cally, they showed that that in high income countries …nancial depth is positively correlated with output growth over the 1960-1985 period, but that this result is not robust to dropping the 1960s. A similar result is the "vanishing e¤ect" of Rousseau and Wachtel (2011). These authors show that the positive e¤ect of …nance on growth is not robust to using more recent data and suggest that the vanishing e¤ect may be due to the …nancial crises which are often associated with rapid …nancial deepening.
Arcand et al. (2015a) and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) provide an alternative explanation for the vanishing e¤ect. Speci…cally, they check whether there are decreasing returns to …nancial deepening and test whether there is a point in which these decreasing returns become negative.
In Arcand et al. (2015a), we use di¤erent estimation techniques and types of data (pure cross section, cross-country panels, and industry-level data) and …nd that the relationship between …nancial development and economic growth is non-monotone. Our point estimates suggest that the marginal e¤ect of …n-ancial depth on economic growth becomes negative when credit to the private sector reaches 100 percent of GDP (the exact threshold depends on the speci…cation).
While we do not study the channels through which a large …nancial sector may reduce GDP growth, we conduct extensive robustness checks and also explore cross country heterogeneity. We …nd that the too much …nance result is not driven by poor institutions, …nancial crises or macroeconomic volatility. We also …nd that there is no vanishing e¤ect in our quadratic speci…cation. In the last two decades there has been an increase in the number of countries where the size of the …nancial sector is above the too much …n-ance threshold. As a consequence, the vanishing relationship between …nancial depth and growth identi…ed by Rousseau and Wachtel's (2011) could be due to the fact that models that do not allow for non-monotonicity su¤er from an omitted variable bias. Empirical work that uses data up to the 1990s does not pick up this misspeci…cation because the sample does not include enough countries with a level of …nancial depth above the threshold.
An alternative explanation for the vanishing e¤ect is that not all credit is created equal. Most theoretical models focus on how the …nancial system allocates credit to productive investment projects. However, households …n-ance (especially mortgages) plays an important role in most countries (see, for instance Jordá et al., 2016). Using data for a sample of 45 countries, Beck et al. (2012) …nd that credit to households ranges between 20 and 85 percent of total credit to the private sector. They also show that, while there is a statistically signi…cant correlation between economic growth and credit to enterprise, there is no signi…cant correlation between economic growth and credit to households. It is thus possible that the "too much …nance" result is really a "too much household …nance" result. While in Arcand et al. (2015) , we show that the too much …nance result is robust to controlling for the share of household …nance, data on household …nance are limited in terms of country coverage and time periods. More research in this direction is required.
More importantly, credit to the private sector (the standard indicator of …nancial depth used in cross country regressions) is likely to be an imperfect indicator of …nancial development. Therefore, this measure cannot fully capture the various channels and mechanisms through which a well-developed …nancial system can support economic development (Beck 2015) . If this is the case, we need new measures of …nancial development that can assess whether a country's …nancial system is appropriate for this country's institutional framework and macroeconomic environment. Attempts to build richer indicators of …nancial development that encompass a large number of structural and policy variables include Barajas Be as it may, the too much …nance result showing that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between credit to the private sector and economic growth has proven to be robust and has now been corroborated by a large number of papers Kharroubi, 2012, 2015 Cline (2015a, b) argues that the this result is mostly a statistical artifact. I now describe Cline's main argument and provide a rebuttal to his claim that the too much …nance result is just a statistical artifact.
. . . or statistical illusion?
Cline (2015a, b) suggests that the "Too Much Finance"result is an artifact of spurious attribution of causality. He uses a small theoretical model that, in his view, shows that quadratic e¤ects in a typical …nance-growth regression are subject to a negative bias. He corroborates his argument by showing that regressing growth over the number of doctors, R&D technicians, and telephones always yield coe¢ cients that imply an inverted U relationship between each of these variables and economic growth. As there is no theoretical justi…c-ation for such a result, he concludes that the …nding is due to a statistical artifact similar to that leading to an inverted U relationship between growth and …nancial depth.
In Arcand et al. (2015b), we provide a rebuttal to Cline's criticism of the too much …nance result. First, we show that his simple model does not show that the quadratic term in the growth …nance relationship is negative. It simply shows that the quadratic term has a sign which is the opposite of the linear term. As such, he implicitly assumes that the linear term is positive and hence the quadratic term is negative. But, of course, this is no longer a proof but an assumption. More importantly, we show that if we use Cline's assumptions and then set the quadratic term equal to zero (i.e., we use Cline's model to derive the equation which is normally estimated in the …nance and growth literature), we …nd that the linear term becomes negative: a result that contradicts the …ndings of the whole body of the …nance and growth literature. Therefore, either Cline's main assumptions are right and the linear models used in the pre-2011 literature are wrong or Cline's assumptions are wrong. 4 In Arcand et al. (2015b), we also show that Cline's …nding of a quadratic relationship between growth and each of number of doctors and R&D is not robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. When we re-estimate Cline's regressions including country …xed e¤ects, the quadratic relationship between growth and each of number of doctors and R&D disappears. The quadratic relationship between …nance and growth is instead robust to controlling for country (and year) …xed e¤ects. In fact, the baseline estimates of Arcand et al. (2015a) always include …xed e¤ects. Cline (2015b) responds that, in his view, a model that does not include …xed e¤ect is preferable to our …xed e¤ects model (even if standard speci…cation tests reject poled OLS or random e¤ect estimations). I disagree.
Avenues for future research
There is convincing evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between …nancial depth and economic growth. However, there is no consensus on the drivers of this result. Instead of providing concluding remarks that would repeat what already stated in the paper, this section provides a quick assessment of the possible explanations for the too much …nance result and points to potential avenues for future research.
Crises. The …rst potential explanation has to do with …nancial crises. There is evidence that rapid credit expansion is often followed by …nancial crises, and …nancial crises have large macroeconomic costs (for a review, see Claessens et al., 2014). While Arcand et al. (2015) show that the "too much …nance" result is robust to controlling for banking crises, it would be interesting to test whether banking crises that are associated with rapid …nancial deepening are di¤erent from other types of banking crises and then check whether this di¤erence can explain the too much …nance result.
Misallocation of talents. In 1984, James Tobin pointed out that: "All university educators know that …nance is engaging a large and growing proportion of the most able young men and women in the country." (Tobin, 1984, p.1) and hinted that an excessively large …nancial sector may lead to a misallocation of talents. Philippon and Reshef (2012) describe the evolution of the wage premium (i.e., di¤erences in remuneration that are not explained by observable individual characteristics) in the US and show that there is a close association among the …nancial sector premium, the size of the …nancial sector, and …nan-cial deregulation. Philippon and Reshef (2013) provide international evidence which is consistent with the US data and Boustanifar et al. (2017) use data for 23 countries to show that …nancial deregulation has a causal e¤ect on wages in the …nancial sector and may lead to socially ine¢ cient risk-taking. Finally, Kneer (2013) and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) show that misallocation of talents may indeed play a role in explaining why an excessively large …nancial sector has a negative e¤ect on economic growth. Future research should try to ground these …ndings in a structural model aimed at evaluating the social costs and bene…ts of a large …nancial sector.
Di¤erent types of …nance. The third possible explanation has to do with the fact that there are di¤erent types of …nance: good …nance (which pools saving, facilitates exchange and improves capital allocation through the production of ex ante information and ex post monitoring) and moral-hazard fueled bad …nance (excessive household lending and speculative risk-taking activities which do not contribute to price discovery). The too much …nance results could thus be explained by the fact that, as the …nancial sector grows, the bad …nance component becomes relatively more important. A test of this hypothesis would require collecting detailed data on the di¤erent components of the …nancial sector. This is a challenging but potentially fruitful endeavor.
Political capture. The last explanation focuses on the political economy of …nancial regulation (Johnson, 2009 ). There is evidence of substantial lobbing by the …nancial industry (Igan et al., 2011) and given that …nancial deregulation a¤ects the rents captured by …nancial industry participants (Boustanifar et al., 2017) , it is possible that a large …nancial sector, which increases the lobbing power of the …nancial industry, would lead to more pressure for socially ine¢ cient …nancial regulation which, in turn, further increases the lobbying power of the …nancial industry. While the results of Boustanifar et al. (2017) are consistent with this interpretation, I am not aware of any study that speci…cally examines the growth implications of this political capture channel.
